Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) : 3 We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights--older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 
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(or ruling as he thought right) for fear of offending someone. And perhaps owing to that same recklessness or courage, I think Douglas also had an unusual, almost oracular capacity to grasp large, momentous truths-and to proclaim them with the eloquence that their gravity called for.
Whatever you may think about the result or the legal reasoning in Griswold v.
Connecticut, for example, and however ironic the words may seem given Douglas's own marital adventures, his paean to marriage in the case seems moving and true. We can understand why 3 some couples have incorporated Douglas's language into their wedding ceremonies. And we may even wish that some scholars currently writing in a deflationary way about marriage could grasp the sense of Douglas's pronouncement.
My theme in this lecture, however, arises out of another of Douglas's celebrated utterances-his assertion in Zorach v. Clauson that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." The statement has two parts. The first is sociological in nature: 4 "We are a religious people." This seems to be basically an empirical proposition and, granting that it is a generalization subject to significant exceptions, most research seems to confirm it : 5 there is no reason why an atheist could not accept that conclusion, regretfully perhaps, as a purely See infra notes 6 3 empirical matter.
Justice Douglas's second claim is more political or perhaps theoretical in nature: our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. For convenience, let's call this "the presupposition claim." To be sure, Douglas did not elaborate on exactly how our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being, nor did he offer evidence or argument in support of the presupposition claim. It is not surprising that he did not do these things: that would not have been Douglas's style. He tended to proclaim, or to declaim-to issue sweeping, majestic utterances. An uncommonly intelligent man, he surely had the capacity to offer close argument for his views if so inclined, but usually he was not so inclined; he seemed to lack the patience, or the motivation.
In this case, though, and writing in the early 1950s-the period in which "under God" was added to the Pledge and Ten Commandments monuments proliferated across the country-even a more fastidious justice might have thought that argumentation for Douglas's claim was That was a half-century ago, though, and things have changed-drastically. The proposition that our institutions presuppose a Supreme Being cannot be taken for granted now.
A quick Westlaw search indicates that Douglas's statement was last quoted by a Justice On the contrary, what may be the most influential understanding of our constitutional order (at least in the academy)-namely, the sort of "political liberalism" or secularist neutrality associated in various versions with people like John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, Amy Gutman, and Bruce Ackerman-insistently denies that our institutions presuppose any such thing. On the Court itself, an occasional justice-Justice Scalia, perhaps, or Justice Thomas--might still affirm Douglas's claim. And other justices conceivably might quote Douglas for historical or rhetorical purposes. But we would be shocked to find any similar outright declaration in a current Supreme Court majority opinion. The Court today tries to be assiduously inoffensive-inoffensive to the 7 people who count, anyway -and to prevent other public officials from doing or saying things 8 that might offend those people or cause them to feel like "outsiders" ; and it is obvious that 9 official statements proclaiming that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being" might easily have those undesired effects.
Thus, a public figure who tries to stand up in a conspicuous way for the conception of America that Douglas tersely asserted should be prepared to be reviled, perhaps sued, possibly (at See, e.g., Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11 Cir. 2003 The providential answer maintains that a mindful, personal God works actively in history to bring about His purposes-it will be most convenient here to follow traditional usage in adopting the masculine pronoun-and that He blesses and causes to prosper not only individuals but also nations who acknowledge and reverence Him. This faith can sometimes support triumphalism and smugness, but it need not: it can also express and inspire hope and humility and a struggle for justice on behalf of the poor and oppressed.
The providential view has obvious scriptural roots-particularly in the Hebrew scripture I have been talking about commitments to equality and to rights. But more generally, it is arguable that an even more basic and constitutive commitment-to rule of law-rests on theistic assumptions. Though that suggestion will seem exotic today, it would not have seemed especially provocative to leading figures in the Anglo-American legal tradition from Alfred to
Bracton to Fortescue to Coke to Blackstone-all of whom affirmed the basic idea that human law derives from the law of God. As Coke put it, a common law decision "agrees with the judicial law of god, on which our law is in every point founded." In nineteenth century America, 21 likewise, judges and scholars routinely recited that "Christianity is part of the common law," and in a fascinating and illuminating article Stuart Banner shows that this maxim was significant not so much for any consequences it had for specific legal cases or controversies, but rather because it expressed "not a doctrine so much as a meta-doctrine." This meta-doctrine helped support a "non-positivist" view of the common law "as having an existence independent of the statements of judges," and hence as something that was there to be "discovered," not made.
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natural law closely associated with Christianity undergirds all law).
Banner, supra note at 60. echoing Douglas, that our legal institutions "presuppose a Supreme Being."
The philosophical rationale for the presupposition claim can be offered in stronger or weaker versions. In the strongest version the rationale would assert that our commitments to equality, rights, and rule of law can be justified on theistic assumptions and cannot be justified in any other way. Though in the past I have sometimes made that sort of strong claim with respect to rights, today I would be more cautious, about both the positive and negative components.
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The theistic arguments for rights, equality, and law are complicated and subject to criticism, I
think. And it is very hard to prove a negative: you might knock down one or several nontheistic rationales for rights or equality, for example, but how can you be sure that someone will not devise a better one? So a more modest version of the philosophical claim would assert that at presupposition claim is at least somewhat undermined.
But I think it is clear that the interpretation is misleading. Jefferson was to be sure a "secular" and "Enlightenment" thinker-but not in the sense that modern secularists want those terms to carry. A full explanation would surely be complex, but for present purposes we can limit ourselves to changes at the level of constitutional doctrine and, more specifically, to two crucial requirements. But there is a separate "prudential" standing component, the majority hastened to explain, that can be invoked to avoid deciding cases that there is good reason not to decide, and the majority grasped at this doctrine to avoid addressing the question on the merits.
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But repudiation is not a politically viable response to the overall problem. We might be willing to eliminate a phrase here, a minor symbol there. But not many Americans-including law professors, and Justices-will cheerfully denounce all or significant parts of Jefferson's Virginia Statute, the Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's Second Inaugural, and on and on.
The strategy would amount to a massive repudiation of much in our history that we have thought to be the most inspiring and praiseworthy.
So what other responses are available? One tempting possibility is denial or repression, in the psychological sense. We might just try to avoid thinking about the discrepancy-to put the offending past out of mind. The Supreme Court's majority opinion in the Newdow case could be taken as a technical instance of this response. The dilemma facing the Court was apparent: on any honest view, the words "under God" in the Pledge do send a message endorsing religion, but it would also have been extremely inexpedient as a political matter for the Court to order that the words be stricken. So the Court understandably might have wished that the problem would just go away, and it used standing doctrine to achieve that happy evasion-at least for a year or so.
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But again, the strategy of ignoring or forgetting is not promising as an overall response to the problem. The Pledge of Allegiance case will come up again: indeed, it is already pending.
More generally, it is very hard just to forget our history, and hard to remember it while studiously
neglecting to notice the discrepancies between what revered figures like Jefferson and Lincoln
See, e.g., Laycock, supra note at 224.
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Rehnquist did assert unequivocally that recitation of the Pledge is "a patriotic exercise," 52 but this assertion can be taken as a denial that the Pledge affirms a religious idea only if "patriotic" exercises and religious affirmations are somehow mutually exclusive or incompatible. Nothing in Rehnquist's opinion suggests that he perceives any such incompatibility. Rehnquist also asserted that recitation of the Pledge is not a "religious exercise" in the sense that prayer is, and is not an "establishment" of religion. But his assumption seems to be that it is possible to affirm a religious idea without actually engaging in a religious or devotional exercise and without "establishing" religion. And this assumptions seems eminently plausible. Suppose a public official is asked, "Do you believe in God?" and she replies, with apparent sincerity, "Yes, I do." She has thereby made a religious affirmation, but it would be odd to say that she has either engaged in a "religious exercise" or that she has "established" religion.
. Whatever sectarian ends its authors may have had in mind, our continued repetition of the reference to "one Nation under God" in an exclusively patriotic context has shaped the cultural significance of that phrase to conform to that context. Any religious freight the words may have been meant to carry originally has long since 22 version of the argument ascribed by critics to Rehnquist-and plainly discernible, I would say, in some of Justice O'Connor's explanations-insults our intelligence, because it tries to get us to accept a blatant non sequitur. Patriotic expressions and religious expressions are not mutually exclusive-far from it-so the argument "patriotic, therefore not religious" seems an error that even a child would spot. It brings to mind the Dilbert cartoon in which Dogbert is speaking to Dilbert: "I was wondering, Dilbert, whether you were stupid or just incredibly ignorant. But then I thought to myself, 'Whoa, Dogbert, you're being narrow-minded. He could easily be both. '" 54 Despite these embarrassments, the revisionist strategy is a way to avoid repudiating a vast portion of our political heritage. Or perhaps not: because if we formally preserve our past only by fundamentally transforming its meaning-its substance--haven't we thereby repudiated our heritage as it actually was and as we have heretofore accepted it?
There might be a way to avoid these problems: perhaps we could acknowledge that the expressions of Jefferson and Washington and Lincoln, and the 1954 Congress, were in fact religious at the time they were made, so that they would be constitutionally objectionable if made in the same sense and spirit today: but in fact we do not have to disavow them because by now, for us-for us as a people, that is-they have lost their religious character (though they may still have that character for some citizens as individuals). This is essentially the tactic adopted by
Justice O'Connor in her Newdow concurrence. This same duality will be apparent in the arguments advanced by each side of the Decalogue Debate. Next winter, we will witness oral advocates arguing before the high court-with a straight face, mind you-that the commandments possess absolutely no spiritual significance for anyone; they are purely 'historical artifacts.' And precisely as they intone this constitutional equivalent of the philanderer's mantra ('She means nothing to me, honest! '), angry citizens on the marble plaza before the Court will be waving signs saying, 'Put God back into Government' and 'Yaweh or the Highway. ' By the same token, atheists and civil libertarians on the other side-folks who have survived decades of Sunday school and reruns of CBS's Touched by an Angel-will insist, in Court and out on the plaza, that even a passing glance at 'Honor Thy Father and Mother' will either turn their children into mad evangelicals, or open the door to a lifetime of religious persecution and ostracizing. 24 option A-which is in fact Justice O'Connor's rationale.
It is worth pausing to appreciate this situation. Justice O'Connor has all along been the major sponsor of the "no endorsement" doctrine, and her account of why the Pledge of Allegiance does not violate that doctrine probably comes as close as any interpretation can to being the official explication of the doctrine. By that interpretation, we can and will save portions of our national heritage by clenching our teeth and making representations about that heritage that, even as we make them, we have to know are simply not believable-not true.
And it is not just Justice O'Connor who finds herself in this position. Other Justices will do the same. Public officials who want to defend traditional, revered practices and expressions are forced to resort to the same sorts of transparent misdescriptions. There is no time here to discuss the details, but we will see-we have already seen-a similar phenomenon in recent controversies about the Ten Commandments. We see it in establishment clause controversies 58 of various types, around the nation. It is a troubling jurisprudence, I think, that places citizens and officials in the position of routinely having to make affirmations that they cannot seriously believe to be true. Or, to put the point more crudely, of lying.
But suppose I am wrong about this-along with Laycock and Shiffrin and all of the students in my seminar. Suppose that Justice O'Connor is right in saying that the words "under God" in the Pledge originally had religious significance but that for us as a people (as distilled into an "objective observer") they no longer have that significance and hence are constitutionally permissible. The implication is that if Congress were to reenact the 1954 provision today, or were to enact it for the first time today, the exact same words would in that case be unconstitutional. That seems curious. And it provokes questions.
For example, does O'Connor's view entail that the words "under God" in the Pledge actually were unconstitutional at the time they were added, so that in theory if they had been challenged in a lawsuit at that time they should have been declared unconstitutional by a prescient court? So was it only thanks to a fortuity-that no one sued, that the courts did not yet adequately understand the First Amendment--that the words survived long enough to achieve constitutional status? The words were unconstitutional then, in 1954, and they would also be unconstitutional now, if freshly enacted, but under some sort of constitutional laches notion words that both were and would be unconstitutional somehow are not?
Or should we rather say that the constitutional principle itself changed, so that it was alright for government to endorse religion in 1954 but it became unacceptable later on? So the words were constitutional then and now--though only because their meaning has fortuitously changed in beautiful parallel with changes in the governing constitutional principle?
Cf. Perry, supra note at 125 ("How strange that the citizens of a nation whose rebirth 59 was rooted in a God whose 'judgments . . . are true and righteous altogether' should now be told that it is uncivil or impolite, if not constitutionally or morally illegitimate, to bring their religion to bear as they participate in politics.").
See supra note 60 
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Either way, I can't help thinking that there is something very odd about this position.
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Suppose we try to apply the same logic to some other classic statement from our history. Can a public school teacher, for example, display the national motto-"In God We Trust"-in class?
Can she recite the Declaration of Independence to students-in particular the part about "Nature and Nature's God" or the affirmation that we are "endowed by our Creator with certain unalienable rights"? The answer is contested, no doubt, and the issues are just beginning to surface in actual disputes : thus far the litigation has mostly focused on more conspicuous And yet this seems to me a very peculiar instruction to give to teachers or other public officials and employees: "You are permitted to talk about and even read from the document which more than any other has been thought to express this nation's most fundamental commitments--but only so long as you do not actually mean to affirm and promote the rationale for those commitments that is explicitly asserted in that document." How can it be that the government of a country and its officials are permitted to report but not actually to affirm the beliefs on which the country was founded?
GEORGE ORWELL AND THE DISAVOWAL OF HISTORY
In contemplating this state of affairs, an adjective that naturally comes to mind is "Orwellian," and though it is probably overused, in this case I believe that the adjective comes close to being apt. The term is understood, of course, as an allusion to George Orwell's chilling dystopian novel about a society that is horrible in many respects: but one of them is that the 61 government-Big Brother-is engaged in a massive, ongoing effort (implemented in the Ministry of Truth) to reshape history to fit current political needs and enhance the power of the Party. If the nation, Oceania, is currently at war with Eurasia, then citizens must and do believe that the nation was always at war with Eurasia. If tomorrow foreign policy shifts so that Oceania is at peace with Eurasia but at war with Eastasia, then citizens must and will believe that the nation has always been at peace with Eurasia and at war with Eastasia. History is what the nation, or 62 at least the Party, needs it to be. This manipulation of history is possible only through the cultivation of a technique known as "doublethink." The master of doublethink must be able " [t] o tell deliberate lies while genuinely believing in them, to forget any fact that has become inconvenient, and then, when it becomes necessary again, to draw it back from oblivion for just so long as it is needed. . . ." 63 The protagonist in the story, Winston Smith, quietly resists the government in various respects, but perhaps above all he resists its efforts to manipulate history. In a struggle to remember the past as it was, he clings to memories (even painful ones) of his own childhood ; 64 he questions people who lived before the present tyranny ; he finds and treasures objects from an 65 earlier time. At great risk to himself he saves, in his memory, a document that he once held in 66 his hand and that, while inconsequential in itself, proves that at least one event in the past did not happen in the way Big Brother currently represents it. When he undertakes the almost 67 suicidally dangerous task of meeting and speaking openly with O'Brien, whom at that point Winston believes to be part of the resistance, his last toast upon parting emphasizes the importance of truthfully remembering the past. 
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In the end, Winston's efforts come to naught: the Party's power to rewrite-and thus, in effect, destroy-history overwhelms him. Today we have nothing quite like the Ministry of Truth; cynics might propose analogues but the differences, fortunately, are large. (Even in the novel, one difficulty is that it is hard to imagine how such a massive effort in manipulation could succeed.) But although this is not 1984, it is arguable that similar processes (and a large measure of doublethink) are at work in the Court-directed effort to avoid the embarrassment that so much in our history-so much that we have previously revered and celebrated and regarded as foundational for our political community-is at odds with what currently articulated constitutional doctrine prescribes. So it was a fitting fortuity, perhaps, that it was in 1984 that the "no endorsement" doctrine entered constitutional jurisprudence.
As I have suggested, that doctrine has in some unmeasurable proportion reflected or brought about a sort of constitutional revolution. As a result, in 1952 a constitutional decision could be based on the truism (as it then seemed) that "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being," whereas a half-century later not only is that truism no longer deemed true: its utterance as an official matter by public officials is at least in principle forbidden by prevailing constitutional doctrine. What was true then now cannot even be saidnot officially, at any rate, not if current doctrine is faithfully followed.
As I have tried to argue, this transformation entails a disowning of our history in one way or another. To summarize: current constitutional doctrine would seem to require that we repudiate the official vestiges of the religious aspects of our past. Or, if we find that prescription
It is perhaps a symptom of the contempt for historical truth that the current doctrinal 69 regime promotes that the one opinion in Newdow that tried honestly to face up to historical fact that modern establishment doctrine and decisions are based on demonstrable misreadings of the past caused its author-Justice Thomas-to be promptly denounced as being on the "lunatic fringe. In response, I would very quickly offer three observations. First, it seems to me that we are sometimes unjustifiably complacent in taking national continuity for granted. What is it that holds a diverse group of people with different languages, backgrounds, and interests together as a political community? The matter is surely complex and even, I think, mysterious. Nations, we are plausibly told, are "imagined communities" -it is perceived or imagined bonds that cause us 72 to think of ourselves as constituting a nation called "The United States of America"-and a common revered history is surely one of the most important bases of such imaginings. Insofar as we treat our history as something to be forgotten or disowned or overcome, these bonds are broken and cast off, and the question "Why are we a nation?" becomes more urgent, and more troubling. We might have learned from the twentieth century that even nations that appeared formidable and secure can unexpectedly come apart, sometimes with devastating consequences.
In this situation, I would suggest that complacency toward the historical foundations of our community is reckless and irresponsible.
Second, the progressive rejection of history depends on the assumption that things are getting better, not worse. And most of us probably believe that in many important respects, our current constitutional self-understanding is an improvement over past versions: slavery is again the most salient case in point. But at least for myself, I would not place the affirmations in the Perhaps the answer is something like this: We humans are finite creatures situated in place and time, in history, and we maintain our identity and continuity-our mortal reality, really--by maintaining our connection to a history. Conversely, if we are cut off from our history, or if we degrade our history into a mutable fabrication fashioned not according to truth but rather by present perceived needs, then we lose our identity and become merely transitory phantoms of shifting consciousness and conversation, without continuity or substance. One of Winston's colleagues, Syme, is at one point a character in the story, but then his name and identity are blotted out and he becomes an "unperson." In this way, a person can be "lifted clean out of the 77 stream of history," as Orwell puts it, as if he never existed. Our reality is inextricably tied, we 78 might say, to our historicity.
I am not sure whether this is a valid account of personal identity. But the account seems worth entertaining, and it seems even more cogent for a people, or a community or nation, than for individuals. For a nation, history is not merely what holds it together: it is only as a historical entity that a nation enjoys reality in the first place.
After all, does anyone believe that a political community has anything like an immaterial soul that might give it identity independent of its temporal history? And in this view, it seems that whether this nation exist and can "long endure," as Lincoln put it, depends among other things on having leaders who are bold enough, or at least reckless enough, to proclaim the large, enduring truths that constitute it. Truths like "we are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."
